Middle Eastern geopolitics has stopped being a distant concern and become a critical factor in the cost structures of companies across the South Pacific. The launch of coordinated military operations between the United States and Israel against Iran on February 28, followed by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz on March 2, has triggered a logistics shockwave that Ecuador is already beginning to tally.
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), roughly 20 million barrels of oil pass through the Strait of Hormuz every day — 20% of global crude consumption — originating from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iraq, Kuwait, and Iran. Around 150 tankers are currently anchored in open waters of the Gulf, avoiding transit altogether.
Why This Is Not a Distant Problem for Ecuador
Ecuador occupies a paradoxical position in this crisis: it is a crude oil producer, yet structurally dependent on imported refined products. Its three refineries process around 175,000 barrels per day against domestic demand of 291,000 barrels. In 2025, the country spent $6.238 billion importing fuel and allocated $752 million to subsidize domestic sales. That gap between what it produces and what it consumes is the direct transmission line between Hormuz and the Ecuadorian budget.
Petroleum expert Nelson Baldeón warns that if the strait remains affected, it is not just crude prices that rise — logistics costs and war-risk insurance also increase, directly pushing up the CIF value of refined product imports. The price band mechanism cushions the pass-through to end consumers, but that buffer carries a fiscal cost. In a scenario where crude sits between $100 and $110 per barrel, Baldeón notes that the fiscal deficit could grow dramatically if the subsidy structure is not adjusted.
There is a second, less obvious but equally real channel of impact: the logistics of non-oil exports. The president of Ecuador’s Banana Exporters Association, José Antonio Hidalgo, confirmed that the sector is monitoring the situation and that several shipping lines have already announced logistical reorganizations involving alternative routes. The Middle East is the third-largest destination for Ecuadorian bananas, with Turkey absorbing 36% of regional shipments, the UAE 13.7%, and Iraq 6.12%.
The Cost Already Showing Up in Quotes
The effective closure of the strait has generated an operational shock that is already driving up insurance and freight costs, regardless of physical production volumes. War surcharges are not a forecast — Hapag-Lloyd activated its war risk surcharge on new bookings from March 2, and Maersk activated its conflict emergency surcharge on the same date.
Who Wins, Who Loses
The picture for Ecuador’s oil exporters is mixed. WTI closed nearly 7% higher following the attacks, but the 2% drop in domestic production recorded in January 2026 limits the country’s ability to fully capitalize on a high-price environment. Refined product importers, on the other hand, face unmitigated pressure: prices rise while purchase volumes cannot be reduced, because domestic demand is inelastic.
Non-oil exporters shipping to the Middle East — bananas, shrimp, and flowers — face rising logistics costs and less reliable routes, compounded by a regional client base dealing with its own urgent priorities. The sector acknowledges it is still assessing the full scope of the impact.
Two Scenarios
The likely scenario — contained disruption with persistent surcharges. Amrita Sen of Energy Aspects considers a sustained full closure unlikely. What she does consider probable are targeted attacks on tankers that will keep markets on edge. In that case, the physical conflict resolves within weeks, but war surcharges and uncertainty premiums remain embedded in quotes for months. Key indicator: a ceasefire with verifiable guarantees of free transit.
The dangerous scenario — sustained closure with fiscal fallout. If the strait remains restricted, the market could lose between 8 and 10 million barrels per day. The additional output agreed by OPEC+ on March 1 — 206,000 extra barrels for April — represents just 0.2% of global demand: a political signal, not a solution. For Ecuador, this scenario combines limited oil revenues due to low production with an imported fuel bill that the national budget has very little room to absorb. Sustained attacks on Gulf port infrastructure, or confirmation of a physical closure lasting more than two weeks, would be the trigger.
What Cannot Wait
The war surcharge is already in this week’s freight quote — and in the ones ahead. What most Ecuadorian companies have yet to factor into their models is the delayed effect on equipment and space availability on routes with no direct connection to the Persian Gulf. That second wave arrives with a three-to-six week lag. The time to review freight contracts, cargo insurance coverage, and exposure to affected routes is not when spot rates have already spiked. It is now.
Sources:Primicias.ec; Expreso.ec; CNBC; The Maritime Executive; Al Jazeera; Infobae; Actualidad.es; EIA.